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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
To avoid repetition, Petitioner Peters incorporates by reference the 
arguments made by Petitioner Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners 
Association, L.L.C. in its Reply Brief filed on March 6, 2006, in the companion 
case, No. 20050805. This Reply Brief will start where the Reply Brief in the 
companion case left off. 
In his Opening Brief in this case, Petitioner Peters argued that the long 
established rule is that the trustee has exclusive authority over the assets held in 
trust. Respondent countered in its Respondent's Brief (inadvertently mistitled 
"Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari") that the Utah legislature 
changed the rule by including a person who holds a power of appointment in the 
statutory definition of trust "beneficiary"1 and that this Court changed the rule by 
its 1949 decision in Cronquist v. Utah State Agr. College.2 In reply, Petitioner 
Peters incorporates by reference the reply made in the Forest Meadow case - that 
the Utah legislature's including a holder of a power of appointment in the statutory 
definition only solved the problem of the unknown beneficiary, and that the 
1
 Utah Code Ann. sec. 57 - 4a - 4(l)(j)(2000) ("Utah Recording Act, 
Presumptions"). 
2
 114 Utah 426, 201 P.2d 280 (1949). 
4 
quitclaim deed in the Cronquist decision did not convey the grantor's interests in 
the trust res but only his possible rights in a farm as his father's heir. 
Petitioner Peters then argued in his Opening Brief that if this Court decides 
for Petitioner him on the beneficiary's authority issue, it should either consider the 
agency issue or remand to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration because the 
Court of Appeals' holding is based on its false claim that W. Brent Jensen was the 
president of Security Title. 
Respondent countered in its Respondent's Brief that the agency issue is 
outside the grant of certiorari and therefore this Court must affirm even if it 
decides for Petitioner Peters on the beneficiary's authority issue. 
In Reply, Petitioner Peters incorporates by reference the reply the petitioner 
made in the Forest Meadow Reply Brief based on the United States Supreme 
Court precedent of Piper Aircraft v. Reyno? 
Respondent also made a number of arguments in its Respondent's Brief that 
do not go to the interpretation of the recorded documents, but are personal to Mr. 
Peters. For example, Respondent opens its Brief by saying that "Peters filed this 
action six years ago in an effort to avoid annual assessments of $ 175 . . ." and 
3
 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
5 
that Mr. Peters has voted at Association meetings.4 The truth is those statements 
are false and irrelevant. The truth is that Mr. Peters filed his action when the 
special service district was still maintaining the roads (and Respondent has as yet 
made no assessments) and that Mr. Peters has never voted at Association 
meetings. But, if Petitioner Peters replies to every irrelevancy, half truth, and 
untruth in Respondent's Brief, he will exhaust the patience of the Court and the 
page limitation for the brief without getting to the real issue in the case - do the 
recorded documents make the 1973 CC&R's valid and binding? 
So, in this Reply Brief Petitioner Peters first argues that all the personal 
arguments that Respondent made against him are irrelevant. Either the 1973 
CC&R's are valid and binding as a matter of law on all the property they cover (all 
1,200 acres) or they are not binding at all. He then argues that the question of 
whether they are valid and binding is to be determined from the three recorded 
documents - the 1965 Bates Deed, the 1973 CC&R's themselves, and the 1976 
Plat. Finally, he argues that those three documents support neither the trust theory 
nor the agency theory. 
ARGUMENTS 
1. There is really only one issue in this case - do the 1965 Bates Deed 
4
 Respondent's Brief, p. 2. 
6 
and the 1976 Plat validate the 1973 CC&R's as a matter of law? 
As a practical matter, CC&R's must bind all the land in the area they 
purport to cover. For example, they can't cover the lots of the owners who vote at 
the Association meetings and not cover the lots of owners who don't. CC&R's 
that do not bind all the land they purport to cover cannot accomplish their purpose 
- to establish the rules for the development of the neighborhood. 
What this practical truth means is that all the arguments Respondent makes 
against Mr. Peters as an individual are irrelevant. CC&R's that bind Mr. Peters 
personally but not the rest of the 1,200 acres could not accomplish their purpose. 
On the other hand, recorded documents are binding on everyone. So, 
Petitioner Peters will only reply to Respondent's arguments that are based on the 
three recorded documents - (1) the 1965 Bates Deed, (2) the 1973 CC&R's, and 
(3) the 1976 Plat for Pine Meadow Ranch Plat D. These three documents either 
establish as a matter of law that the 1973 CC&R's are valid and binding on the 
whole 1,200 acres they purport to cover (not only the eight Pine Meadow Ranch 
Subdivisions, but also on the western part of Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D, and 
on the unplatted land) or they do not. 
The phrase "as a matter of law" is important. The premise of the Utah 
Statute of Frauds and the Utah Recording Act is that rights in real property are to 
7 
be decided initially from the recorded documents, reading the documents in 
accordance with rules of law. This means that every lawyer and every judge will 
interpret them in the same way. In a case like this one where no unrecorded 
documents exist, questions of "inquiry notice" are irrelevant. The initial 
interpretation will be the final interpretation. 
2. The Court of Appeals and Respondent both acknowledge that the 
1965 Bates Deed does not establish that there was a trust or that PMRI had 
any rights in the 4,264.68 acres it conveyed. 
Both the Court of Appeals and Respondent acknowledge that the 1965 
Bates Deed is insufficient, standing alone, to establish that there was a trust or that 
W. Brent Jensen, or Desert Diversified Development (W. Brent Jensen's corporate 
entity for the Forest Meadow Ranch subdivisions), or Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. 
("PMRI," his corporate entity for the Pine Meadow Ranch subdivisions) had any 
rights in the 4,264.68 acres conveyed by the 1965 Bates Deed. The only 
indication in the 1965 Bates Deed that there actually was a trust is the word 
"trustee" appearing after the name of the grantee, "Security Title Company." The 
Court of Appeals and Respondent both acknowledge that unless the extrinsic 
evidence proves there actually was a trust, Security Title is to be taken as the 
owner for its own benefit under the doctrine of descriptio personam 
8 
3. The Court of Appeals falsified the identity of the declarant of the 
1973 CC&R's to create false evidence that there actually was a trust. 
The Court of Appeals uses the 1973 CC&R's as extrinsic evidence that 
there was a trust. These are the actual words of Judge Greenwood's opinion: 
" . . . (2) Respondent recorded the 1973 Covenants, Conditions, and 
Restrictions (the 1973 CC&Rs), which affect Lot 6 and specifically 
prescribe that each owner "pay to [Respondent]: . . .annual 
assessments or charges," as well as "interest, costs, and reasonable attorney 
[] fees." Additionally, the 1973 CC&R's provide that assessments are a 
continuing lien on the properties."5 
With all due respect for the Court of Appeals and for Judge Greenwood (and 
focusing entirely on what they did and not why they may have done it), 
"Respondent" did not record the 1973 CC&R's. PMRI did. 
Again with all due respect, Judge Greenwood clearly thinks Respondent, 
not PMRI, recorded the 1973 CC&R's, for she later writes: 
" . . . Respondent is a homeowners association seeking to act in that 
capacity by placing covenants, conditions, and restrictions on subdivided 
property."6 
Please reread that quotation. Please note that Judge Greenwood says "on 




 2005 UT App 295, para. 8. 
9 
1,200 unsubdivided acres. The relevant acreage in this case was not subdivided 
until the 1976 plat was recorded. Much of the 1,200 acres is still not subdivided. 
Please look now at the 1973 CC&R's, Appendix document "2." Please note 
that the declarant is "PINE MEADOW RANCH, INC." all capitals on the first 
page. Please look at the title page of this brief. Respondent is "PINE MEADOW 
RANCH HOME ASSOCIATION." 
Next, please ask yourself as a matter of logic, whether the provisions cited 
by Judge Greenwood that provide for assessments prove there actually was a trust. 
Petitioner submits that providing for assessments is typical of all CC&R's, not 
just those where the declarant is a trust beneficiary. If the existence of a trust does 
not follow as a matter of logic, how can it follow as a rule of law? 
4. Respondent falsified the language of the 1973 CC&R's to create false 
evidence that PMRI owned the covered land. 
Respondent argues that the statutory presumption that statements in 
recorded documents are true7 applies to PMRI's statement in the 1973 CC&R's 
that it "is the owner of or intends to acquire" the 1,200 acres.8 Then, Respondent 
drops the phrase "or intends to acquire" and states, as though it were the truth: 
7
 Utah Code Ann. sec. 57 - 4a - 4(l)(j)(2000). 
8
 Respondent's Brief pp. 13-14. 
10 
"The 1973 CC&Rs recite that Pine Meadow was the 'owner' of 'the South 
half of Section 22, Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian.'"9 
Please reread that quotation. Does that language sound familiar? Please 
check the property description in the 1973 CC&R's. It begins "The South one-
half of section 16 . . ."10 It says nothing about section 22. Next, please check 
the property description in the 1971 Rerecorded CC&R's in the companion case. 
It begins "The South half of Section 22. . . ."n 
Respondent is pulling the old switcheroo. It substituted the language from 
the 1971 Rerecorded CC&R's in the place of the language in the 1973 CC&R's. 
Respondent knows that the actual language of the 1973 CC&R's, that PMRI "is 
the owner of or intends to acquire" the 1,200 acres is useless for the purposes of 
the statutory presumption. Anyone on this earth can say "I am the owner of or 
intend to acquire" any property on this earth and not be lying. The actual language 
of the 1973 CC&R's is useless for purposes of invoking the presumption. The 
language from the 1971 Rerecorded CC&R's is much better. So Respondent 
9
 Respondent's Brief p. 14. 
10
 1973 CC&R's, Appendix document "2," page 1. 
11
 1971 Rerecorded CC&R's, page 1, Appendix document "2" in 
Petitioner's Opening Brief in the companion, Forest Meadow case. 
11 
pulled the old switcheroo. 
But, it isn't important. Petitioner Peters incorporates by reference the 
argument made in the companion case that the statutory presumption does not 
apply to claims of ownership, but only to facts like corporate name changes and 
mergers.. 
4. Nothing on the 1976 Plat shows that there actually was a trust or 
that PMRI was trust beneficiary as to the 1,200 acres covered by the 1973 
CC&R's. 
The last document is the 1976 Plat for Pine Meadow Ranch Plat "D." The 
Owner's Dedication is signed by PMRI. "Wesley Brent Jensen" and "Zella J. 
Jensen" signed for it as its President and Secretary. Security Title Co., Trustee" 
also signed. "Gordon H. Dick" and "Nancy H. Bartlett" as Exec. Vice President 
and Asst. Secretary" signed for it. There is a "Subdivided s Note," signed by W. 
Brent Jensen to the effect that the roads, streets and rights of way are not dedicated 
to the public but will remain the property of the subdivider, PMRI. 
Does this plat - read in accordance with the applicable rules of law - prove 
that there was a trust and that PMRI was trust beneficiary as to the 1,200 acres 
covered by the 1973 CC&R's? Apart from the word "trustee" following the name 
Security Title Company, nothing on the document shows that a trust actually 
12 
existed or that PMRI was a trust beneficiary. The plat only covers a small fraction 
of the 1,200 acres covered by the 1973 CC&'s. 
Respondent argues that the Owner's Dedication on the plat proves PMRI 
was an owner.12 But, the truth is that an owner's dedication is like a quitclaim 
deed. Its function is to assure that the property shown as dedicated to public use 
on the plat is so dedicated, so anyone can sign it, just as anyone can sign a 
quitclaim deed. The rule of law is that ownership is to be determined from the 
chain of title - running from grantee back to grantor until the chain reaches the 
origin of all Utah title, the United States of America. Owner's dedications on plats 
do not replace the chain of title. 
But, it is true that an owner's dedication, like virtually anything on a 
recorded document, can put people on inquiry notice. Petitioner Peters did read 
the plat before he bought his lot. The subdivider's note put him on inquiry notice 
that PMRI might have an interest in the land. Inquiry notice does not create rights 
in property. It only keeps rights created by unrecorded documents from being 
invalidated by failure to record. He searched the chain of title and found none. 
He search the records of Respondent and found none. 
If the fact that PMRI signed the owner's dedication on 1976 Plat proves as a 
12
 Respondent's Brief, pp. 16 -17. 
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matter of law that there was a trust with PMRI as trust beneficiary as to the 1,200 
acres, it will create a paradox. There are other Pine Meadow Ranch plats in the 
record that cover other parts of the 1,200 acres where other people signed the 
owner's dedications. For example, Pine Meadow Ranch Plat "G" was signed by 
Max E. Bangerter, Howells, Inc. (by Bobby G. Waggoner, vice pres.), and by 
Larry LeRoy Smith and Sybil Burton Smith, along with Security Title.13 If 
PMRI's signing the owners dedication on Plat "D" proves it was the trust 
beneficiary as a matter of law, why doesn't Howels, Inc.'s signing the owners 
dedication on Plat "G" prove it was the trust beneficiary? 
This Court should stay with the established rule, the statutory rule. The 
Utah Statute of Frauds14 provides that any trust with respect to real property must 
be written. Therefore, the identity of the trust beneficiary will always be 
determined from the written terms of the trust, not from things like owner's 
dedications on plats. 
6. PMRI's role as "developer" did not give it agency authority to 
impose the 1973 CC&R's on the whole 1,200 acres. 
Respondent then argues that PMRI's role as "developer" gave it agency 
13
 In the Record at R-0449. 
14
 Utah Code Ann. sec. 2 5 - 5 - 1 (1998) ("Utah Statute of Frauds"). 
14 
authority to impose the 1973 CC&R's. It is true that PMRI did have some role as 
developer as to four of the eight plats in the Pine Meadow Ranch Subdivisions, 
but, if one includes the unplatted land, it played a developer role as to less than 
half the 1,200 acres. Certainly its role as developer as to plats "A," "B," "C," and 
"D" is shown by the subdivider's notes on those plats, but, as Petitioner Forest 
Meadow argued in the companion case, status as a developer does not create 
agency authority. Under the Utah Statute of Frauds,15 agency authority can only 
be created by a written power of attorney. 
A further point is that if a subdivider's note on a plat creates agency 
authority at all, it must do so as to the land covered by that plats, not as to the 
whole 1,200 acres covered by the 1973 CC&R's. 
Finally, Petitioner Peters incorporates by reference the arguments on this 
point made by Petitioner Forest Meadows in its Reply Brief in the companion 
case. 
7. The inconsistencies between the 1973 CC&R's and the plats show 
there was no coherent development plan. 
PMRI was not the developer of all of the eight Pine Meadow Ranch 
subdivisions. It played a development role in plats "A," "B," "C," and "D," but it 
15
 Utah Code Ann. sec. 2 5 - 5 - 1 (1998) ("Utah Statute of Frauds"). 
15 
played no role in plats "E," "F," "G" and"I" (there is no plat "H"). Nor did W. 
Brent Jensen or any of his other entities play any development role in the latter 
plats. In any case, the 1973 CC&R's purport to cover the whole 1,200 acres, not 
just the land that would be subsequently platted. If the 1973 are valid and binding, 
they are valid and binding in accordance with their terms. This means they must 
be binding on the unplatted land. The owners of the unplatted land will be in for a 
nasty surprise when they get their assessment bills. 
One area covered by the 1973 CC&R's presents a paradox. This is the 
western part of Forest Meadow Ranch Plat "D", the Forest Meadow subdivision 
involved in the companion case.16 It was platted in 1972. It is not covered by the 
1971 Rerecorded CC&R's (the CC&R's in the companion case) because they only 
apply to the south half of Section 22. The western part of Forest Meadow Plat "D" 
is in Section 21, not Section 22, and all of Section 21 is covered by the 1973 
CC&R's. But, Forest Meadow Ranch Plat "D" was platted in 1972. Now, if the 
notations on the 1972 Forest Meadow Ranch Plat "D" prove as a matter of law 
that Deseret Development was the trust beneficiary as to the land covered by that 
plat in the companion case, how can the notations on Pine Meadow Ranch Plat 
16
 The plat for Forest Meadow Ranch Plat "D" is included in Petitioner 
Forest Meadow's Opening Brief as Addendum document "3 ." 
16 
"D" prove that PMRI was the trust beneficiary as to the same land in this case? 
Platting the western part of Forest Meadow Plat "D" as part of the Forest 
Meadow subdivisions and, then, the following year covering it with the 1973 
CC&R's for the Pine Meadow subdivisions makes no sense at all. The section 
line between Section 21 and Section 22 runs right through some lots. Covering 
the western part of a lot with one set of CC&R's and covering the eastern part with 
another set of CC&R's makes no sense at all. 
If validating the 1973 CC&R's actually made sense, if validating them 
actually resulted in a workable neighborhood covered by one set of CC&R's, this 
would be a different case. But the truth is that the inconsistencies, gaps, and 
overlaps of the different CC&R's show there was no coherent development plan. 
Security Title Company was a Utah title company. Surely if it had wanted 
to bind all 1,200 acres with the 1973 CC&R's it knew what it had to do - record a 
declaration to that effect. Or, if it had wanted the 1973 CC&R's to cover only the 
eight platted Pine Meadow Ranch subdivisions and not the unplatted portion of 
the 1,200 acres, it would have recorded a declaration to that effect. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above Petitioner Peters asks that the Court hold that a 
trust beneficiary does not have authority to impose binding covenants, conditions, 
17 
and restrictions on land held by its trustee in trust and reverse the Court of 
Appeals on that point. Then, the Court should either hold that as a matter of law 
under the Utah Statute of Frauds PRRI was not the authorized agent of Security 
Title and reverse the Court of Appeals on the agency issue, or remand the case to 
the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in the light of the truth that (1) W. Brent 
Jensen was not the president of Security Title and (2) it was PMRI, not 
Respondent, that was the declarant of the 1973 CC&R's. 
Dated: March 6,2006. 
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